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The Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU, Court) SEGRO judgment is more than 
just a recent addition to the debate on the so-called rule of law crisis in the European Union. 
As this case note shows, SEGRO touches on the most fundamental aspects of the European 
Union and its relation to the Member States. From an economic perspective, the Court in 
SEGRO’s treatment of property rights and the ability of economic actors to rely on their lawfully 
concluded contracts forms the undercurrent of economic investment in the Union. From a 
functional perspective, the case is perhaps indicative of a wider change in the role of the Court 
with respect to national courts’ margin of discretion. From a normative perspective, SEGRO 
gives rise to an important discussion on the difference between fundamental rights and economic 
freedoms in the EU since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, as well as 
‘constitutional homogeneity’ in the EU after Hungary’s legislative reforms. Finally, from an 
evolutionary perspective, SEGRO marks another iteration in perhaps a wider shift in the 
trajectory of the Court with respect to questions that menace the integrity of the functioning of the 
European Union. This case note first examines the background (I) and facts of the case (II). 
Then it analyses the Opinion of the Advocate General (III) and the findings of the Court (IV). 
It concludes with a discussion based not only on an analysis of the SEGRO case (V), but also 
going beyond the case by analysing the most recent jurisprudential developments concerning 
Hungary and the issue of the (non-respect) of the Rule of Law in the European Union(VI).  
The Rule of Law is one star in a constellation of ideals that dominate our political 
morality: the others are democracy, human rights, and economic freedom. We want 
societies to be democratic; we want them to respect human rights; we want them 
to organize their economies around free markets and private property to the extent 
that this can be done without seriously compromising social justice, and we want 
them to be governed in accordance with the Rule of Law.1 
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1 BACKGROUND TO THE CASE  
On the 25th of April 2011, the New Fundamental Law of Hungary was passed, not long after 
the conservative-national Fidesz party led by Victor Orban won the general election in April 
2010.2 These events formed the ‘trigger’ for what some deem the “Hungarian problem”.3 
The lead-up to this point, however, not even a decade ago, is complex, multifaceted and 
historical in nature. Some point to the fact that Hungary’s accession to the European Union 
created problematic expectations for an improved standard of life that were not met.4 
Hungary has stagnated economically and its historically traditional values played a role in the 
rise of the new government.5 While a full discussion of the text of the New Hungarian 
Fundamental Law is beyond our scope here, suffice to say that according to some scholars 
“neither democracy nor the rule of law emerges intact [...].”6 The text makes a distinction 
between Hungarians living on Hungarian soil or Hungarians living abroad and other 
nationalities living in Hungary, puts in place the so-called “cardinal laws” via which the 
government has quickly entrenched new provisions in various sectors, and finally directs 
some duties towards the national community rather than towards other individuals.7 
The European Union has been grasping for a way to intervene in this new political 
and legal order without risking backlash; some question whether the EU is structurally 
capable to deal with such a situation.8 In light of the above, the Commission has taken action. 
Through soft law, the Commission issued a Communication on a New EU Framework to 
Strengthen the Rule of Law in 2014.9 The Commission also has the ‘nuclear’ option at its 
disposal, via Article 7 TEU. However, the triggering of Article 7 in September 2018 by the 
European Parliament is unlikely to yield a substantive outcome. Part of the reason for this is 
that Hungary is not a ‘lone wolf’ with regard to state behaviour that could be seen as 
threatening traditional notions related to the rule of law.10 Remarkably, the Vice-President of 
the Commission even called a meeting of the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme 
Judicial Courts of the EU in order to deal with problems related to the independence of the 
judiciary in Hungary.11  
SEGRO is also not the first CJEU case touching on the rule of law in Hungary. On 
April 25, 2012, the Commission brought infringement proceedings against Hungary for 
lowering the retirement ages of judges, prosecutors and notaries to 62.12 The Court found 
that the scheme gave rise to a difference in treatment which was incompatible with Council 
                                                 





7 ibid.  
8 Andreas Hofmann, ‘Resistance against the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2018) Intl J of L in 
Context 258. 
9 Commission, Communication, “A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law” (2014). 
10 Poland and even France have come under fire in the rule of law context. See, for example, Tomasz 
Tadeusz Koncewicz, ‘The Capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of institution(s), 
Fidelities and the Rule of Law in Flux’ (2018) 43 Review of Central and East European Law; for the French 
example, see Amnesty International, A Right Not A Threat – Disproportionate Restrictions on Demonstrations under 
the State of Emergency in France (2017). 
11 See (n 2).  
12 Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary EU:C:2012:687.  
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Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, noting Hungary’s failure to provide evidence 
establishing that more lenient provisions could not have achieved the same objective.13 
Similarly, in a judgment rendered in February 2017, again, infringement proceedings brought 
by the Commission, the Court ruled that by making nationality a condition necessary to 
access the notarial profession, Hungary had not performed its Article 49 TFEU freedom of 
establishment obligations.14 Finally, on July 19, 2018, the Commission sent a letter of formal 
notice to the Court of its decision to refer Hungary to the Court for infringement 
proceedings relating to Hungary’s non-compliance with asylum law.15 
2 THE FACTS OF SEGRO 
SEGRO is a land development company, seated in the United Kingdom, with investors who 
are not Hungarian nationals.16 SEGRO acquired ‘usufruct’ rights — rights to fruitfully use 
land, (in contrast to full ownership rights) — over land in Hungary in the early 2000s.17 The 
district property registry deleted those rights on the basis that they were rights acquired 
against laws passed in 2013 (law on transitional measures and law on property registry).18 
Specifically, the 2013 laws mandated that usufruct rights had to be obtained by people who 
had a ‘close family relationship’ with Hungarians.19 SEGRO brought an action in the 
Administrative and Labour Court contending that those 2013 laws infringed Hungarian law 
as well as EU law. The Administrative and Labour Court referred the issue to the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary which dismissed the request but declared that the 2013 laws 
were unconstitutional in that they did not offer compensation for the deprivation of validly 
acquired land-use rights.20 However, the Hungarian government did not change the laws 
subsequent to the Constitutional Court’s ruling. It instead claimed that the rules of civil law 
were enough to ensure compensation.21 The Administrative and Labour Court then referred 
the matter to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg for a preliminary ruling. 
The referring court took the view that the 2013 laws restricted freedoms of 
movement—of establishment and of capital—of EU nationals who are not Hungarians 
because they ran the risk of causing an untimely dispossession of valid contractual rights.22 
In that regard, the Hungarian legislature did not sufficiently establish the necessity nor the 
proportionality of the 2013 laws. The 2013 laws’ indiscriminate cancelation of contractual 
land-use rights, given that the laws reduced 20 year usufruct rights to only a few months, was 
not justified.23 However, the Constitutional Court upheld the objective of the 2013 laws that 
                                                 
13 ibid paras 71-73. 
14 Case C-392/15, Commission v. Hungary EU:C:2017:73. 
15 European Commission Press Release, Migration and Asylum: Commission takes further steps in 
infringement procedures against Hungary, 19 July 2019, accessed from, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-4522_en.htm 
16 Joined Cases C-52/16 and C-113/16 SEGRO and Horváth v. Vas Megyei Kormányhivatal EU:C:2018:157, [15].  
17 ibid, para 16. 
18 ibid, para 17. 
19 ibid, para 8. 
20 ibid, paras 20-21. 
21 ibid, para 22. 
22 ibid, para 23. 
23 ibid, para 26. 
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productive land can only be owned by the natural persons who work it—which is guaranteed 
under the New Fundamental Law—in rejecting the request.24 More generally, the stated 
objectives of the laws were to prevent speculation of land, depopulation of the rural 
countryside, practices which attempted to circumvent national law and to penalize 
infringements concerning exchange controls.25 
The questions referred to the Court of Justice raised a multitude of issues. First, the 
2013 laws constituted a deprivation of legally created contractual rights. By linking the 
requirement of a close family relationship with the usufruct rights, the Administrative and 
Labour Court wanted a definitive answer as to the compliance with EU law of this national 
requirement.26 Next, the referring court asked whether the national legislation was lawful in 
light of the fundamental freedoms. Moreover, the referring court had doubts as to whether 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter ‘the Charter’) might come into conflict with 
these national provisions27; specifically, the right to a fair trial and the right to property. 
Finally, while the laws impacted both Hungarian nationals and nationals of other Member 
States, there was also an element of discrimination due to the fact that, in the majority of 
cases, the close family relationships would privilege Hungarian nationals resulting in indirect 
discrimination.28 The way the Court answered these questions sheds light on complex 
dimensions of EU law.  
3 ADVOCATE GENERAL SAUGMANDSGAARD ØE’S  OPINION 
The Advocate General (hereinafter AG) Saugmandsgaard Øe came to five major conclusions 
in his Opinion.29 First, he found that the request for a preliminary ruling was admissible. 
Second, the AG established that the freedom of capital should apply to the case of usufruct 
land rights. Third, the AG delved into whether there was a breach of the free movement of 
capital despite Article 345 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(hereinafter TFEU). Fourth, the AG raised the difficult question of whether or not the laws 
were justified. Finally, the Opinion laid out an intriguing argument for why the Court should 
not respond to the question of whether there is a violation of Article 17 and Article 47 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The AG concluded that the Court would have jurisdiction regardless of if the usufruct 
rights were created before May 1, 2004, the date on which Hungary entered the European 
Union, since the case concerns administrative decisions which took place after May 1, 2004. 
30 Moreover, any national court may refer questions of EU law for preliminary rulings. 
Contrary to the Hungarian government’s argument that the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary’s judgment is binding on the referring court, “[...] national courts have the widest 
discretion in referring questions to the Court […] and that discretion and that obligation are 
an inherent part of the system of cooperation between the national courts and the Court of 
                                                 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid paras 24-25. 
26 ibid, para 29. 
27 ibid.  
28 ibid, para 33. 
29 See SEGRO (n 16); Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in SEGRO EU:C:2018:157. 
30 ibid, para 47. 
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Justice established by Article 267 TFEU [...].”31 Thus, the Constitutional Court’s stance did 
not bar the request’s admissibility.  
The AG found a restriction of the free movement of capital despite Article 345 
TFEU’s principle of neutrality towards the rules of ownership being left to the Member States.32 
Article 345 TFEU does not exclude national measures relating to the acquisition of 
agricultural land from the purview of the fundamental rules of the EU’s legal system – 
particularly the fundamental freedoms and the rules on non-discrimination.33 To the AG, the 
national measures constituted indirect discrimination according to the source of the capital 
due to the fact that Hungarian nationals can more easily satisfy the conditions laid out in the 
Hungarian law as compared with citizens of other Member States. The standard to use in 
this determination is whether the proportion of other Member State nationals affected is 
greater than the proportion of Hungarian nationals.34 Finally, this finding of indirect 
discrimination cannot be influenced by whether the holder of such rights can obtain financial 
compensation from the other party to the contract.35 
According to the AG, none of the Hungarian government’s three arguments to justify 
the restriction of the free movement of capital could pass muster. First, the extinction of the 
usufruct rights by the Hungarian legislation was disproportionate to the objective of 
penalizing infringements of the national legislation on exchange control because the 
Hungarian laws are neither narrowly tailored nor necessary to achieve its stated goals.36 
Second, although the prevention of abusive practices is a legitimate reason to curtail one of 
the four freedoms, the laws assumed a general occurrence of abusive practices, which was 
not necessarily the case and, even so, could not be used to justify such a restriction. Third, 
the AG disagreed with Hungary that the justifications based on the public interest were 
linked to the use of agricultural land because, again, the measures were neither appropriate 
nor necessary to achieve such objectives.37  Finally, the AG asked the Court to clarify whether 
discriminatory measures can ever be justified by public interest objectives; he believed they 
could not.38 
On the applicability of the Charter to the case, the AG found that the Court should 
refrain from answering that question where the measures at issue “do not implement 
provisions of EU secondary law”39 but do infringe on the economic freedoms. In this 
respect, the AG saw two different situations concerning the use of a justification by a 
Member State to restrict the free movement provisions: (i) the Schmidberger situation40, where 
a fundamental right serves as a justification for the restriction and, (ii) the ERT situation41, 
                                                 
31 ibid, para 45. 
32 ibid, para 66. 
33 ibid.  
34 ibid, para 80. 
35 ibid, para 84. 
36 ibid, paras 90-118.  
37 ibid, para 114.  
38 ibid, para 118. 
39 ibid, para 122.  
40 Case C-260/89, Schmidberger EU:C:2003:333. In this case, the Government of Austria, in order to justify 
a restriction of the free movement of goods resulting from a demonstration which had entailed the closure of 
a major transit route, had relied on the protection of the demonstrators’ rights to freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly (see paragraphs 17 and 69 et seq. of that judgment). 
41 Case C‑260/89, ERT EU:C:1991:254. In this case, ERT, a Greek radio and TV company had a 
concentration of exclusive rights to broadcast its own programmes and the exclusive right to receive and 
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where the breach of a fundamental right nullifies the justification for the restriction.42 The 
AG found that SEGRO falls within the latter case.43 Nonetheless, it was not necessary to 
interpret the Charter to reject Hungary’s justifications. Moreover, taking the opposite view—
that infringing the Charter could be examined independently of any violation of the 
economic freedoms—would lead to a scenario where all national legislation affecting cross-
border situations might be challenged in light of the Charter.44 This would run counter to 
Articles 6(1) Treaty on European Union (hereinafter TEU) and Article 51(2) of the Charter 
in that it might increase the powers of the Union as laid out in the Treaties.45 
4 FINDINGS  OF  THE  COURT 
4.1 PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS: JURISDICTION, DIRECT EFFECT, AND 
NATIONAL COURTS HIERARCHY 
The Court rejected Hungary’s jurisdictional arguments stating that Hungary’s 2004 (after the 
usufruct rights were acquired) accession to the EU has no bearing on the Court of Justice’s 
ability to examine the facts in relation to laws from 2013.46 Because Articles 49 and 63 TFEU 
are directly applicable, they can render national law inconsistent with them inapplicable. 
Recognizing that the referring court and the Constitutional Court of Hungary clearly disagree 
over the substance of the case, the Court agreed with the AGs Opinion and disregarded the 
fact that the lower court was side-stepping the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of the case. 
Courts, at any level of the national hierarchy in the EU, have wide discretion to utilize the 
preliminary reference procedure laid out in Article 267 TFEU.47 
4.2 SUBSTANCE: AN OVER-RELIANCE ON ECONOMIC FREEDOMS OR 
CAUTION WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS? 
The Court first dealt with the issue of which freedom was applicable to the situation at 
hand—the freedom of establishment or the free movement of capital. While it was prima facie 
possible to examine it under either, the Court ultimately examined the question under the 
free movement of capital.48 Looking at the purpose of the national legislation, the Court held 
that, in light of prior case law connecting capital and land-use as well as the fact that non-
Hungarian EU citizens were deprived of an acquired contractual land right in Hungary due 
to a change in national law, the situation ought to be examined under the free movement of 
capital.49 
                                                 
retransmit programmes from other Member States (see paragraphs 21 to 23 of that judgment). The Court 
held that Member States can rely on derogations provided for in the Treaty on grounds of public policy, 
public security and public health only insofar as the national rules at issue are compatible with the 
fundamental rights, in particular freedom of expression (see paragraphs 43 to 45 of that judgment). 
42 SEGRO Opinion (n 29), paras 128-133.  
43 ibid.  
44 ibid.  
45 ibid, para 138.  
46 SEGRO (n 16).  
47 ibid, para 45. 
48 ibid, para 58. 
49 ibid, paras 50-60.  
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The Court found outright that the national legislation here would be a restriction on 
the free movement of capital.50 Compensation for the extinguishment of the rights would 
not affect this finding.51 The mere fact that the national restrictions would likely discourage 
non-residents from making investments in the Member State was enough to be caught by 
Article 63.52 However, with respect to the question of discrimination, the Court was less 
concrete. Tying the land-use rights to ‘close family ties’, the national legislation was not 
considered to be directly discriminatory because the criteria was deemed to be possibly 
independent of national origin.53 Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the 2013 laws likely 
constitute indirect discrimination in that they disadvantage nationals of states other than 
Hungary, despite the statistics submitted which showed that merely 5% of the usufruct 
holders were nationals of states other than Hungary.54  However, ultimately, such a finding 
would be for the national court to determine.55 
The remaining part of the Court’s judgment in SEGRO assessed whether the national 
legislation was objectively justified and whether the means used were proportional in light of 
its objectives.56 The justifications given were deemed to be consistent with common 
agricultural policy goals in Article 39 TFEU. Therefore, the Court had to analyse their 
proportionality. Placing the burden of proof on Hungary, the Court found that the legislation 
was not appropriate because it had no direct connection with its objective.57 The Court relied 
on practical arguments, such as the fact that family ties do not guarantee that the usufruct 
holder will farm the land (and vice versa), in addition to the lack of a foreseeable connection 
between the measure and preventing land fragmentation, rural migration and working the 
land you own.58 Moreover, the Court examined Hungarian Civil law and found that the 
burden on victims would be lengthy and expensive, and compensation was far from-
assured.59 This combined with the fact that it could have been achieved by less restrictive 
measures meant the national legislation went beyond what was necessary.60 
The Court then turned to the stated objective of preventing the infringement of 
exchange control legislation. Again, the Court stated that Hungary’s legislation requiring a 
close family relationship was, from the available evidence, unrelated to exchange control 
legislation.61 The Court spun the prior statistics submitted by the Hungarian government by 
arguing that the fact that 95% of all those affected by the law are Hungarian constituted 
proof to that effect.62 Finally, as pointed out by the Advocate General, a myriad of other 
more tailored and less restrictive legislative possibilities exist to achieve such goals. 
The Court finished its thorough examination by considering the justification put 
forward by the Hungarian government of preventing practices designed to circumvent 
                                                 
50 ibid, para 66.  
51 Ibid, para 62.  
52 ibid. 
53 ibid, para 67.  
54 ibid, paras 71-72.  
55 ibid, para 79. 
56 Ibid, paras 81-126.  
57 ibid, para 85.  
58 ibid.  
59 ibid, para 91.  
60 ibid, para 94.  
61 ibid, para 105. 
62 ibid, para 104.  
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national law.63 Rejecting the Hungarian government’s claim, the Court found that a narrowly 
tailored analysis which permits the flexibility that a case-by-case analysis provides is necessary 
in this context to comply with the proportionality requirement.64 It then emphasized that the 
presumption of general abusive practices of owning land goes too far when there are, again, 
many other less restrictive options available.65 Finally, the Court recalled that it is “settled 
case-law that grounds of a purely economic nature cannot constitute overriding reasons in 
the public interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty.”66 Having found an unjustified breach of the free movement of capital, the Court 
sidestepped addressing the questions related to Articles 17 and 47 of the Charter, finding 
those questions unnecessary “to resolve the disputes in the main proceedings.”67  
5 ANALYSIS  OF  THE  CASE:  ECONOMIC,  FUNCTIONAL  AND  
NORMATIVE  PERSPECTIVES 
5.1 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY RIGHTS — AN EVOLUTIONARY 
AND COMPARATIVE VIEW 
“What could be clearer and more necessary for the ordering of society than rules that say 
‘this is mine’ and ‘that is yours’?”68 Humans tend to think about property rights as a given 
thing; the possession of property is somehow inherent to the human mind.69 “The manifest 
necessity for property rules together with their seemingly common sense nature makes it 
natural to think of property law as consisting of rules that are stable and fixed for all time.”70 
This makes the human mind think that property rules, as they are today, have been there 
forever and will be fixed for all time. Of course, as history makes clear, property rules are 
not fixed and they can change in a rapid manner; often in connection with social upheavals. 
The SEGRO and Commission v Hungary71 cases bring about an important discussion 
concerning the economic context behind the economic freedoms and fundamental rights as 
they relate to land use in the European Union. While the SEGRO case involves a deprivation 
of usufruct rights, the violation of the free movement of capital concerns the ability of 
European investors to acquire land-use rights in other Member States and reasonably rely on 
the fact that those rights will not be arbitrarily taken away with no process or compensation. 
There is a clear connection between property rights and economic activity, including, 
foreseeability, the ability to rely on lawfully concluded contracts, and the legislature’s desire 
to encourage investment by Europeans within the EU as it relates to the smooth and efficient 
                                                 
63 ibid, paras 108-126.  
64 ibid, para 117.  
65 ibid, para 122.  
66 ibid, para 123. 
67 ibid, para 128. 
68 Ronald A. Cass and Keith N. Hylton, Laws of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas (Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 13. 
69 See generally, Jeremy A. Blumenthal, ‘'To Be Human': A Psychological Perspective on Property Law’ 
(2009) Tulane LR, 83. 
70 ibid. 
71 Case C-235/17, Commission v. Hungary EU:C:2019:432. The follow-up case to SEGRO, in which the 
Commission brought infringement proceedings against Hungary based on the violation of the free movement 
of capital found in SEGRO and alleging a violation of the EU Charter.  
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functioning of the internal market. A brief look at several philosophic and economic theories 
of property rights informs the tension over property law in the EU that underpins the 
SEGRO judgement and how EU economic freedoms interact with Article 17’s right to 
property in the post-Lisbon Treaty legal landscape. 
Adam Smith, the founder of modern economics, saw property rights as developing 
through four stages: hunter-gatherer, pastoral, agricultural and commercial societies.72 Smith 
argued that property rights would become more complex depending on the stage of 
evolution of the commercial society.73 On the other hand, John Locke developed a property 
rule which was based on labour.74 His basic argument was that something belongs to 
someone if that person puts labour into it and thereby refines it.75 “Locke chose to make a 
‘good for all times’ argument because he wanted to contest Thomas Hobbes’s view that 
property rights were in all instances dependent on the whim of the government.”76 Locke, 
shaped by the political developments in the seventeen hundreds, observed that governmental 
authority might arbitrarily deprive citizens of their property. Accordingly, “Locke saw 
government as sufficiently prone to invasions of interest in property – and with those 
invasions, impositions on related forms of liberty – that he sought a theory that would make 
property prior to, not dependent on, government.”77 In contrast, the utilitarian theory, 
brought forward by Locke’s coeval Jeremy Bentham, focuses on property in connection to 
investment and benefit ie the more rivalrous a good is, the stronger the property rights for 
that good should be.78 For utilitarians, only the one who invested to refine or to produce a 
certain good should be entitled to the property rights associated with that good. Society is 
thus encouraged to produce and refine more goods, since the individual will be encouraged 
to invest in certain goods in order to gain property rights over those goods. Finally, Kantian 
theorists claim that property rights respect and augment the autonomy of the individual by 
allowing him or her to realize and extend their desires and plans through property.79 From 
that perspective, property plays a part in the natural autonomy of the individual, which is a 
fundamental value of society.  
Some scholars see a tension in the EU with respect to the history of property under 
the different European treaties.80 The commitment under the Treaty of Lisbon to implement 
the economic freedoms may, given time and within the wider European integration project, 
demand a rethinking or Europeanization of the current property structures, which are today 
still left to the Member States.81 In this sense, the philosophical and social goals that took 
root in Europeans’ minds well before the idea of the EU came to fruition may manifest 
themselves in the EU in the form of economic rights protected by the four freedoms. 
                                                 
72 (n 69), 15. The subsequently explained property theories are seen through the eyes of Ronald Cass and 
Keith Hylton in their monograph ‘Laws of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas’.  
73 ibid. 
74 ibid, para 17. 
75 ibid. 
76 ibid, para 18. 
77 ibid. 
78 ibid, para 19 et seq. 
79 ibid, para 26.  
80 See eg Daniela Caruso, ‘Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The Case of Property’ 
(2004) 10 Eur LJ, 751; (n 83), 65.  
81 See Gerwyn Griffiths, ‘The Bastion Falls? The European Union and the Law of Property’ (2003) 8 
Conveyancing & Prop LJ, 39; (n 83).  
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However, the brief overview of the philosophical underpinnings surrounding property rights 
in Europe illustrates the difficulty of one single approach to property rights under Article 17 
of the Charter. Interpreting Article 17 will necessarily make the Court of Justice choose to 
value certain theoretical underpinnings of property rights in Europe over others. In the 
United States, this judicial ‘valuation’ took place nearly 100 years ago.  
In the US Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness originally included property rather than happiness.82 It was not until the Bill of 
Rights was passed 15 years later that the ‘takings clause’ in the 5th Amendment was 
recognized.83 In the 18th and 19th centuries however, regulatory ‘takings’, whereby people’s 
use of land was affected by government regulations, were not recognized. It was not until 
later—after the growth of cities and change brought about by the industrial revolution—that 
the US Supreme Court recognized regulatory ‘takings’ by the government as potential 
deprivations under the 5th Amendment in the famous Pennsylvania Coal case.84 In Europe, the 
French revolutionaries were influenced, as were their American counterparts, by the 
philosophies of rights put forward by Locke and Rousseau which affected the legal 
protections ultimately adopted.85 Indeed, the 17th of the rights listed in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, the right to property, contained many of the same 
elements as the US Bill of Rights’ 5th Amendment.86 Moreover, the proposed but ultimately 
rejected European Constitution’s Article II-77 may look familiar. This is because it is the 
exact same as Article 17 of the Charter.87 A transition in European property rights is ripe to 
occur under the Lisbon Treaty. A case similar to the US’s Pennsylvania Coal could push the 
Court of Justice towards a stronger recognition of the fundamental right to property in the 
EU, thereby enmeshing Lockian and Kantian property theories in the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice. Commission v Hungary88 could be the first step in that direction. 
5.2 FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT AND THE 
PRELIMINARY REFERENCE PROCEDURE—A RULE OF LAW PERSPECTIVE 
If we think about the Member States as a group of Labradors all on leashes held by the Court, 
Hungary in the SEGRO case would be on a very tight leash indeed. The margin of discretion 
allowed to the Hungarian courts is slim with respect to their potential domestic analysis. The 
Court seems to go through all possible justifications that the national court might put 
forward to possibly come out the other way on the issue. The evidentiary requirement 
indicated by the Court provides a prime example. Despite stating several times that they have 
                                                 
82 Harvey M. Jacobs, ‘The Future of the Regulatory Takings Issue in the United States and Europe: 
Divergence or Convergence?’, The Urban Lawyer, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 2008) 51-72. 
83 US Const. amend. V. 
84 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
85 Jacobs (n 83), 58. 
86 ibid. It states: "Property being an inviolable and sacred right, no one may be deprived of it except when 
public necessity, certified by law, obviously requires it, and on the condition of a just compensation in 
advance.” 
87 ibid. It states: “Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired 
possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases 
and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their 
loss. The use of property may be regulated by law insofar as is necessary for the general interest.” 
88 (n 16). 
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little facts with which to make a full judgment, the Court then takes what little evidence they 
have and uses it to rule that the 2013 laws’ justifications are neither connected to their 
objectives nor proportionate. The Court utilizes the statistics that 95% of those affected by 
the 2013 law were Hungarian to find that, since the measure primarily affects Hungarian 
nationals, it could not have been related to exchange controls.89 At the same time, the Court 
claims that despite the fact that merely 5% of the affected parties were non-Hungarian, the 
law was still likely indirectly discriminatory in that it disadvantaged non-Hungarians.90 The 
tight leash is indicative of the fact that the Court is wary of Hungarian courts spinning the 
reasoning against the desired protection of the free movement of capital. Because of the 
Court’s extensive response, it would be difficult for the national courts to subsequently not 
reach the same result as the Court on remand. By giving such extensive ‘guidance’, the Court 
is leaving the issue to the national court while doing its best to ensure the outcome. 
The SEGRO judgment indicates that if a Member State is trying to justify national laws 
that infringe one of the four freedoms and raises questions in regard to the rule of law, the 
Court is going to need a high standard of proof that speaks to the law’s non-discriminatory 
and tailored nature in relation to the objectives pursued. Moreover, the burden of proof 
therein falls on the Member State that passed the laws. In another sense, the Court may be 
teeing up further potential avenues for legal action, either in Hungary or elsewhere, where 
economic freedoms and rule of law issues intersect. By giving such a detailed proportionality 
analysis, SEGRO indicates that the Court sought to avoid discord in the national hierarchy.91 
Since “Member States can be held financially liable for the costs incurred by citizens and 
companies on account of a failure to correctly implement or apply EU law”,92 perhaps the 
Court is setting up a possible state liability claim in the event that the Constitutional Court 
of Hungary decides to stick to its original interpretation. 
 One scholar notes, “(a)s in all international legal orders, the implementation of EU 
law essentially relies on the willingness of its subjects to comply […] a necessary condition 
for this system to work is that national courts actually follow the CJEU's interpretations.”93 
The SEGRO case is indicative of the Court trying to walk the fine line between issuing a 
strong judgment while also attempting to ensure compliance. While non-compliance with 
infringement proceedings brought by the Commission can carry sanctions, the preliminary 
reference procedure technically has no enforcement mechanism.94 Given that in addition to 
SEGRO and Mr. Horvath there are over 5000 other potential non-Hungarian plaintiffs in 
this case who might pursue damages against the Hungarian state for having deleted their 
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usufruct rights in violation of EU law, the Hungarian courts certainly have an incentive to 
follow the Constitutional Court’s reasoning rather than that of the Court of Justice. 
5.3 NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE: ECONOMIC FREEDOMS VERSUS 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF PROPERTY 
There are substantive differences between the fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms; the ‘delicate balance’ between these protections is a vital question in EU law.95 
Economic freedoms are recognized in the Treaty while fundamental rights are primarily 
based on the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and, after Lisbon, on 
the incorporation of the Charter articles into the Treaty by Article 6 TEU. 
Finding this ‘delicate balance’ is no easy task for the Court. While economic freedoms 
confer rights on the individual with respect to the internal market, fundamental rights are 
rights with no prerequisites. They concern every individual and are applicable universally 
regardless of the economic status of the person concerned. Indeed, economic freedoms only 
apply in cross-border economic situations. Nonetheless, the four economic freedoms have 
become used as a means to protect the rights of individuals with regard to the free movement 
of persons and services since workers are protected when they work or provide services 
abroad. Thus, while initially the economic freedoms were thought to protect the coherence 
of the internal market,96 in certain situations they also serve to protect social and individual 
rights. Today, many of the economic freedoms clearly overlap with the fundamental rights.97 
Nonetheless, the way they interact with each other and their relative weight when brought in 
one claim together remains an open question. 
The Court in SEGRO limited its analysis to the economic freedoms, preferring not to 
delve into the realm of fundamental rights because they had already found a violation of EU 
law. While the Court has been tasked with balancing fundamental rights and economic 
freedoms in a number of landmark cases, Commission v Hungary, the follow-up case to 
SEGRO, represents the first time where the Commission has asked the Court to rule on a 
failure to comply with the Charter.98 The Court must thus answer the normative and legal 
question it refrained from broaching in SEGRO, ie can and should the Court delve into the 
realm of failure of Member States to comply with the Charter? 
In his Opinion in Commission v Hungary,99 Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe treads 
a careful line in finding that the Court is not competent to pronounce on Article 17 of the 
Charter, that such an analysis would be superfluous and finally that the 2013 laws are 
incompatible with the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter.100 The AG  
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aptly characterizes what is at stake, saying, “at issue is the extent to which the Court of Justice, 
as the highest court, has the jurisdiction to take the place of national constitutional courts 
and the European Court of Human Rights in monitoring the legislation and actions of the 
Member States in the light of fundamental rights.”101 Under Article 51 of the Charter, the 
provisions therein are applicable only when “Union law is being implemented”.102 The 
Commission thus forced the issue on the Court to make a choice between two different 
theories with regard to how to apply the fundamental rights in situations where a violation 
of primary EU law has already been found. 
The logical connection that the Court made in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses103 
—where the Court based its competence on a combination of Article 19 TEU and Article 
47 of the Charter — is a similar leap to what the Commission is asking the Court to base its 
competence on in Commission v. Hungary. A robust argument exists that this is an important 
normative leap to make in terms of ensuring the effet utile of the fundamental rights in the 
Charter, which the Court is tasked with ensuring. Although the rights enshrined in the 
economic freedoms overlap and intertwine in many ways with those of the fundamental 
rights, they are in fact different sources and forms of legal protection. The Court has 
effectuated a balancing exercise between the economic freedoms and rights before, 
delimiting the scope of the freedoms versus the rights in a coherent manner. Limiting the 
ability to vindicate obstructed EU rights which would have resulted from following the 
Advocate General’s reasoning would have meant that the Court had failed to fulfil its role 
under the Hauer case law.104 Further, SEGRO resolves the textual conundrum with respect 
to the field of application of Article 51 of the Charter, when EU law is being implemented 
—an affirmative violation could be considered a failure to implement. Article 51’s positive 
field of application, nonetheless, supports the inapplicability of independently brought 
Charter claims. The Court in Commission v. Hungary105 puts this conundrum with respect to 
Article 51’s scope of application to rest. The rationale of the Court — following the AGET 
Iraklis judgment — is that since Hungary is actively invoking 65(1)b TFEU, which is a 
limitation on the free movement of capital and gives Member States the possibility to 
effectively target illegal capital movements, Article 17 of the Charter applies.106 This finding 
is not to be understood as a general affirmation that the Charter applies to all situations in 
which a Member State is justifying a national measure. However, as soon as a Member State 
tries to justify a restriction on the four freedoms by invoking EU law provisions, the Charter 
becomes applicable. This could give rise to creative litigation strategies of avoiding the 
‘implementation of EU law’ by simply neglecting to justify restrictions and thereby not 
invoking EU law. Yet, the Court seems to anticipate such litigation strategies in cases similar 
to the factual scenario presented by SEGRO by implying that a Member State necessarily 
invokes EU law when it passes legislation regulating land-use in the public interest.107 
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From a value-based perspective, the AG notes in Commission v Hungary that rule of law 
issues are equally as important as the division of competences between the EU and the 
Member States, and that Union citizens can have their fundamental rights vindicated at the 
ECtHR (after having exhausted national remedies). While practically speaking such lines of 
reasoning may carry some weight, from a legal perspective neither argument is persuasive. 
The equality with which the AG sees the rule of law issues and division of competences 
issues speaks rather to the normative need of the Court to rule in this area of law. Moreover, 
simply because a remedy is possible in another forum does not mean that a claim should not 
be accepted. Given the setup in the Treaties, it is hardly possible to forum shop at the Court. 
The Court has an important duty to shut the door on frivolous, redundant and legally 
unjustified Charter-based claims while staying true to its duty to ensure fundamental rights 
for Union citizens given the new status of the Charter under the Lisbon Treaty. 
Before the Commission v Hungary judgment, it was far from clear that the situation 
presented in SEGRO would run afoul of Article 17 of the Charter. A narrow ruling on the 
Article 17’s right to property — utilizing a more lenient proportionality approach than that 
used in SEGRO regarding the standard of proof needed to show narrowly tailored means—
would have refrained from favouring the free movement of capital over the right to property 
or vice versa. The evidentiary requirement to show that Article 17 of the Charter had been 
violated could, based on a purely textual reading, be higher. Indeed, the wording of Article 
17 indicates that it might be a more lax justification analysis than that carried out with respect 
to the free movement of capital employed in SEGRO. Certainly, the public interest of 
preventing land speculation is at stake and property may be regulated by law if necessary for 
the general interest. Therefore, dependent on Hungary’s evidence and justifications as to the 
law’s objectives necessary for the general interest, it was not a foregone conclusion that the 
analysis under Article 17 of the Charter would lead to an identical result to the free movement 
of capital analysis the Court carried out in SEGRO. Nonetheless, the Court in Commission v 
Hungary found that Article 17 must be read in conjunction with Article 52(1).108 The result of 
this emphasis is that the relevant analysis with respect to finding a violation of the right to 
property as guaranteed by the charter is virtually the same as the proportionality test 
employed with respect to the four freedoms. 
6 ANALYSIS BEYOND THE CASE: CONTEXTUALIZING THE 
NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE AND THE ‘ESSENCE OF THE 
RULE OF LAW’ IN THE EU  
The previous discussion on the right to property and economic freedoms raises a crucial 
question: what is the essence of the rule of law after SEGRO and Commission v Hungary? So 
far, the discussion of SEGRO and Commission v Hungary has focused only on economic 
freedoms and economic (fundamental) rights.109 Yet, these two cases put in a broader context 
also concern the need of stopping the inflation of ‘illiberal legislation’ and are thus about the 
need to protect the rule of law in the EU. But quid rule of law? This is the one billion Euro 
question. Are we dealing with the protection of an economic rule of law founded on the 
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sacrosanct economic freedoms and the right to property? Or is it about the protection of a 
substantive rule of law through the application of the EU Charter and its Article 17? Or is it 
both?  Could it be something else? 
In SEGRO, we have already analysed and stressed in the previous section the 
importance of the economic rule of law through the economic freedoms and the application 
of Article 17 of the EU Charter. Yet, a question worth asking in the context of this normative 
discussion is whether the economic rule of law constitutes the essence of the EU rule of 
law.110 Looking at SEGRO and Commission v Hungary, such a conclusion is fully plausible. 
Similar to the situation in the US, the right to property may be seen as a core aspect of the 
rule of law. Yet, by looking at the broader and recent jurisprudential context on economic 
freedoms, the EU Charter and Article 19 TEU, it appears that such a conclusion would not 
entirely characterize the nature of the rule of law in the EU. 
In Commission v Hungary, the Court has taken the opportunity to define and enforce a 
thick and substantive understanding of the rule of law.111 By doing so, it has aligned with the 
recent jurisprudence on the rule of law as a substantive concept.112 After the Opinion of the 
AG in Commission v Hungary, the Court was in fact at a normative cross-roads. It could follow 
the restrictive Opinion of the AG113 regarding the scope of the Charter, thus observing its 
prior jurisprudence according to which the right to property (and other rights) as a matter of 
general principle of Union law can only be enforced against Member States to the extent that 
they ‘implement Union law’. Or, it could follow a very progressive road by applying the 
Charter independently and in surplus to the claim based on economic freedoms. Viva la vida 
loca! The CJEU decided not the follow the Opinion of the AG on this matter114 and correctly 
framed the matter as a fresh and substantive one by utilizing a systemic approach to Member 
State duties similar to its methodology relied in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses.115 
Under this methodology, the respect for the right to property is not ‘simply’ an additional 
commitment of Member States but a partie intégrante of its duties to an EU legal order based 
on the (substantive) rule of law, ie the Charter and, more specifically, article 17 of the 
Charter.116 It is therefore possible to contend that when the Union’s political institutions are 
unable to act (in our case in relation to the impasse of the Article 7 procedure against Poland 
or Hungary), the CJEU is inclined to step in, and the enforcement of substantive rule of law 
is no exception. The merging of the rule of law and the Court’s rights-based enforcement as 
framed for the first time in Commission v Hungary seems almost unavoidable in retrospection. 
As discussed in the previous section, the logical construction that the Court established for 
instance in Associação Sindical dos Juízes is an analogous jump to what the Commission was 
requesting the CJEU to base its competence on in Commission v Hungary. In light of this 
                                                 
110 ibid. 
111 (n 72) paras 49-66. 
112 See Xavier Groussot and Johan Lindholm, ‘General Principles: Taking Rights Seriously and Waving the 
Rule of Stick in the European Union’ in Katja Ziegler et al, Constructing Legal Orders in Europe: General Principles 
of EU Law, Edward Elgar, Forthcoming , Lund University Legal Research Paper No. 01/2019. 
113 See Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-235/17 Commission v. Hungary (n 82), para 89; see also 
Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Joined Cases C-52/16 and C-113/16 SEGRO and Horváth, (n 29), 
paras 119-142. 
114 See Case C-235/17 Commission v. Hungary (n 72), paras 49-66. 
115 (n 104).  
116 Lisa M. Austin, ’Property and the Rule of Law’, Legal Theory vol. 20 pp. 79–105 (2014) (on the 
relationship between the common law of property and the rule of law.  
84                                        NORDIC JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW  2019 (2) 
 
analysis, Commission v Hungary exemplifies the rise of the substantive rule of law by allowing 
the application of Article 17 of the Charter in addition to the provision on free movement 
of capital, the economic freedom. 
Yet, the logic of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses is not only based on a substantive 
approach, but is also strongly anchored within a procedural understanding of the rule of law. 
Importantly, the CJEU already made this procedural construction very clear many years ago. 
For instance, in Opinion 1/91 the CJEU ruled that the Treaties ‘constitutes the constitutional 
charter of a Community based on the rule of law’ and connects this to other, core principles 
of the EU law order, such as supremacy, direct effect and loyalty.117 The judgment in Opinion 
1/91 echoes the wording of Les Verts where the Court first voiced its claim of a rule-of-law-
based Union and associated this to the central role of the Union’s judicial system.118 It is 
worth keeping in mind that Les Verts concerned the application of the rule of law against the 
Union and it was the rule of law that, according to the Court, entailed that the Union’s judicial 
system must be able to indirectly review the legality of acts by the European parliament 
through the system of preliminary rulings. The CJEU has persistently upheld that line in later 
cases, ensuring that the Union judicial systems can review the legality of Union acts.119 Thus, 
much of this case law has focused on the realization of the value of the rule of law, as set out 
in Article 2 TEU, through the ‘complete’ system of institutions and remedies set out in 
Article 19 TEU in addition to evolving around the capability of upholding the rule of law in 
relation to Union measures. Yet, the CJEU has been particularly energetic in recent times in 
noting that the nature of the Union legal order absolutely requires that the Member States 
uphold their duty under Article 19(1) TEU to ‘ensure effective legal protection in the fields 
covered by Union law.’120 This connection was repeated and confirmed in Associação Sindical 
dos Juízes Portugueses and even more recently in Vindel and Commission v. Poland.121 The message 
is crystal clear: the procedural Rule of Law must also be respected by the Member States 
when ‘implementing’ Union law.  
Thus, stemming from the above discussion on the methodology used by the CJEU in 
its rule of law-case law, the rule of law as shaped by the CJEU appears to be not only 
substantive but also clearly procedural. There is a constant jurisprudential reliance on the 
need to ensure an effective judicial review of both the acts of Union and the acts of the 
Member States falling within the scope of Union law. In that respect, one should also not 
forget that the CJEU’s case law on economic freedoms encrypted the procedural rule of law 
on economic freedoms a long time ago. It is now important to take a brief look at the 
procedural rule of law in the jurisprudential matrix of the CJEU, which is closely related to 
the SEGRO case and the free movement of capital.  
In the context of the economic freedoms, the procedural rule of law is rooted in the 
free movement of goods case law on additives in foodstuff from the eighties. In fact, this 
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obligation can be traced back to the CJEU’s judgments in the Muller122 and the German Beer 
case.123 In Muller, the Court decided whether the French ban on food additives for cakes was 
in breach of the free movement of goods. The Court considered that since the prevailing 
Directive124 was intended to achieve only partial harmonization as regards these additives, 
the conditions governing the use of these additives having not yet been determined at the 
Community level, the power of the Member States to adopt rules related to foodstuffs is not 
unlimited.125 Apart from the substantive limits imposed by the Treaty rules on the free 
movement of goods, AG Marco Darmon pointed out that “the harmonization for which 
[the directive] provides, even though embryonic, has the [effect that a] Member State must 
follow [a certain] Community procedure in order to prohibit the use of an additive previously 
authorized”.126 In other words, the Member State has neither unlimited substantive discretion 
nor unlimited procedural discretion to ban an additive in foodstuffs. The CJEU, in the 
German beer case, which concerned a ban on additives for beer, built on the Muller case127. It 
considered that by virtue of the principle of proportionality, traders must be able to apply, 
under a procedure which is easily accessible to them and can be concluded within a 
reasonable time, for the use of specific additives to be authorized by a measure of general 
application.128  
Several procedural safeguards in administrative procedures emerged in relation to the 
justification of measures restricting free movement.129 In Greenham Abel, for instance, the 
CJEU considered whether the national rules could be justified provided that they fit the 
requirements of Article 34 TFEU. The first of these requirements, before the analysis of 
proportionality, is the availability of an accessible and speedy procedure and judicial review 
in case of rejection.130 An example beyond the scope of prior authorization is Laval.131 More 
recently, in Noria Distribution,132 the CJEU clarified its Greenham Abel case law on the need to 
respect the procedural requirements in the context of free movement of goods. In this case, 
the Court assessed French legislation prohibiting the marketing of food supplements whose 
content in nutrients exceeds the upper limits set by that legislation without providing for any 
procedure for the placing on the market of that type of food supplement. The legislation was 
found to constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction for the 
purposes of Article 34 TFEU that could be justified provided that it complied with the 
double ‘requirements’ of Article 36 TFEU as interpreted in  paragraph 34 of the Greenham 
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Abel case.133 In that light, the CJEU considered that, despite the existence of a procedure as 
to the placing on the national market of certain food supplements, the procedure is 
inapplicable to food supplements whose content in nutrients exceeds the maximum doses 
set by that legislation and which are lawfully manufactured or marketed in another Member 
State.134 Therefore, the French legislation was not compatible with EU law since it did not 
provide a procedure in the circumstances of the case.135 The importance of the procedural 
rule of law has now made its way into all the free movement provisions. In this regard, one 
need not look further than the recent and spectacular TopFit & Biffi case delivered in June 
2019 by the CJEU in the context of free movement of persons and citizenship.136 
It appears clear from this short overview that the procedural rule of law is strongly 
present in the economic freedoms and free movement case law of the CJEU. The same 
phenomenon appears true if one looks at the most recent case law of the CJEU with regard 
to the interpretation of the EU Charter, such as Egenberger or Cresco.137 In those two Grand 
Chamber cases, the CJEU tied the application of substantive provisions of the Charter (in 
casu Article 21 of the Charter) to the respect of the principle of effective judicial protection 
under Article 47 of the EU Charter). This is, in our view, no coincidence. It is the result of a 
judicial will to reinforce the procedural rule of law by relying on the Charter. The 
reinforcement is therefore both procedural and substantive as it is founded on the 
substantive provisions of the EU Charter in the procedural context.138 Arnull offers a critical 
analysis of the current state of the procedural law of the Union and queries how it might 
develop in the future, using the conventional narrative sparingly to elucidate changing 
patterns in the case law.139 The author shows that the default position is shifting from national 
procedural autonomy (effectiveness) to the duty to ensure effective judicial protection of 
Union law rights. In other words, the default position is becoming increasingly substantive 
and Charter-based. According to Sacha Prechal, effective judicial protection is a fundamental 
right, which demands a higher intensity of scrutiny compared to the principle of effectiveness 
often relied in the CJEU case law (Rewe-effectiveness).140  The author suggests redefining the 
relationship between ‘Rewe-effectiveness’ and effective judicial protection by contrasting the 
two principles in four sets.141 First, the principle of effectiveness appears to be a less 
demanding standard of judicial review. Second, the general test of effectiveness (practical 
impossibility’-, or the ‘excessiveness’ tests) is formulated in a negative manner that brings, in 
turn, a negative obligation – whereas effective judicial protection implies both a negative and 
positive obligation.142 Third, the principle of effectiveness is described as operating at the 
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Member State – not individual – level. Lastly, Prechal explains that justifications applied with 
regard to the two principles do indeed differ.143  
Commission v Hungary should also be understood as epitomizing the importance of the 
procedural rule of law as it is our view that the substantive rule of law and the procedural 
rule of law often work in tandem. This point is exemplified by paragraph 102 of the 
judgement in Commission v Hungary where the CJEU ruled that: 
Article 65(1)(b) TFEU states that the provisions of Article 63 TFEU are to be 
without prejudice to the right of Member States to take all requisite measures to 
prevent infringements of national law and regulations, to lay down procedures for 
the declaration of capital movements for the purposes of administrative or 
statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public 
policy or public security. In accordance with Article 65(3) TFEU, such measures or 
procedures are not, however, to constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in 
Article 63 TFEU.144 
This paragraph shows once again the close link between the application of the economic 
freedoms and the procedural rule of law. In a similar vein, this procedural logic permeates 
the recent CJEU case law on the independence of judges in the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW) context. As noted by Gutman, the Court in LM:145 
[R]eiterated that the very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure 
compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law, and that maintaining 
the independence of national courts and tribunals is essential for ensuring effective 
judicial protection, as confirmed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the 
Charter, as well as the proper functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure and 
the European arrest warrant mechanism.146 
The procedural rule of law may thus be seen as the ‘essence’ of the rule of law. In that sense, 
it is worth noting that the CJEU in Torubarov in July 2019 went as far as to state that the 
requirements of effectiveness and effective judicial protection as enshrined in Article 47 of 
the Charter constitutes the ‘very essence of EU law’.147 This case is of utmost importance for 
the rule of law debate and also concerns new Hungarian legislation on administrative 
procedure which is said to establish certain procedures and remedies whose purpose is to 
enable the administrative courts to require administrative bodies to comply with their 
judgments except where its application deprives individuals of an effective remedy in 
practice.148 The CJEU ruled that the national court must set aside any provision of a national 
                                                 
143 ibid.  
144 See Commission v. Hungary (n 72).  
145 Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality EU:C:2018:979, paras 51-58. 
146 Kathleen Gutman, ‘The Essence of the Fundamental Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial in 
the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union: The Best Is Yet to Come?’ German Law 
Journal (2019), 20, 884-903, 900. 
147 Case C-156/17 Torubarov EU:C:2019:626, para 73. See also for the same wording Joined Cases C-188/10 
and C-189/10 Melki EU:C:2010:363, para 44. See for a similar approach (but different wording) to 
effectiveness; Case C-573/17, Popławski EU:C:2019:530, paras 52-62.  
148 ibid, Torubarov, paras 71-72.  
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legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice that might impair the 
effectiveness of EU law by withholding, from the national court with jurisdiction to apply 
that law, the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application that might 
prevent EU rules having direct effect.149 So far, the CJEU explicitly considers that the essence 
of the EU rule of law is procedural.150 In light of the previous discussion, this is a very far-
reaching conclusion given the importance of the economic rule of law and substantive rule 
of law both within the EU and at a more theoretical level.151 La fin justifie-elle les moyens or is 
this evolution a deeper marker of the very nature of the rule of law in the EU as a procedural 











                                                 
149 ibid, paras 73-74.  
150 See also in that respect, two pending cases considering Hungarian legislation that may refer to the 
importance to respect procedural requirements. First, Case C-66/18 Commission v Hungary, the Commission 
claims that the legislation, by requiring foreign higher education institutions to offer higher education in their 
country of origin, is in breach of inter alia Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU as well as from Article XVII of 
the GATS and its obligations under Article 13, 14 and 16 of the EU Charter. Second, Case C-78/18 
Commission v Hungary, the Commission claims that the national legislation imposing obligations of registration, 
declaration and transparency on certain categories of civil organizations, and also making it possible for 
penalties to be imposed on organizations that do not fulfil such obligations, has failed to fulfil its obligations 
under Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the EU. 
151 See Jeremy Waldron (n 1), at p.1 and at p. 20. Waldron underlines that the procedural aspect of the rule of 
law is often hidden by the doctrine and given less importance than the other facets of the rule of law. 
According to him, legal philosophers tend to emphasize formal elements of the rule of law. Whereas he 
thinks a fallacy of modern positivism is its exclusive emphasis on the command-and-control aspect of law, or 
the norm-and-guidance aspect of law, without any reference to the culture of argument that a legal system 
frames, sponsors and institutionalizes.  
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